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      Abstract 
 
High external deficits in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are widely 
regarded as culprits of the post-2008 financial crises in the eurozone. This 
paper examines the main drivers of those imbalances and discusses how the 
mix of macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms implemented in 
the last few years has affected the evolution of those countries’ external 
positions. The analysis combines modern theories of the current account and 
of the real exchange rate with panel data regressions to shed light on the 























A key macroeconomic development leading to the financial crises of 2009-
12 in Europe was the emergence of very large deficits in the external current 
accounts (CAs) of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In particular, the 
three southern countries posted CA deficits that exceeded 10% of GDP in 
the run-up to the crises. Not only were such deficits rather sizeable relative 
to those countries’ own historical record since World War II, but also large 
relative to those typically observed in external financial crises in emerging 
markets – where “sudden stops” in capital inflows hit when the CA deficit 
rises above 4 to 5% of GDP (Catão and Milesi-Ferretti, 2014). 
 
To be sure, crisis-free countries with CA deficits of the order of 10% or so 
of GDP are not unheard of historically. Some of today’s advanced 
economies such as Australia, Canada and some of the Scandinavian 
economies, experienced deficits approaching such magnitudes between the 
late 19th century and early 20th century, as swift growth of labor and capital 
inputs together with rising total factor productivity (TFP henceforth) and 
persistent improvement in the price of their exports relative to the domestic 
cost of producing them, assured investors that those deficits would be 
eventually reversed and the large accumulation of external liabilities be fully 
repaid.  
 
Those conditions were not apparent in some of Eurozone by the eve of the 
2009-12 financial crises. Table 1 shows that despite higher real GDP growth 
than the median of other non-crisis EU countries (3.9% vs. 2.2%) since the 
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onset of the euro, key macroeconomic fundamentals were generally weaker 
– and some of them significantly so -- in the four crisis countries. In 
particular, TFP growth was negative in three of the four countries; unit labor 
costs (measured as the ratio of the average wage to labor productivity) were 
also rising relative to the EU average in all four countries, implying that 
domestic production was getting costlier; and so was consumer goods’ price 
inflation, implying an appreciation of the real exchange rate (the	price	of	
domestic	vs.	foreign	goods	expressed	in	the	common	currency)	again	
pointing	to	a	loss	of	external	competitiveness. Finally and no less 
importantly, net foreign assets (NFA) – which is equal to  the accumulation 
of current account balances plus valuation effects – were highly negative in 
Greece, Portugal and Spain at close to 100% of GDP. Furthermore, because 
openness to international trade (as measured by the ratio of exports of goods 
and services to GDP) was lower than the EU average – with the exception of 
Ireland, the ratio of net foreign assets to exports was even higher. This is an 
important indicator of the sustainability of external balances because, in the 
absence of valuation effects, the present value of net external liabilities has 
to be ultimately paid with net exports. 
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Table 1. Real GDP growth and Relative Country Fundamentals in the EU, 1999-2007
       Selected Fundamental Indicators








(1999-2007) (1999-2007) (1999-2007) (1999-2007) (1999-2007) (1999-2007) -2007.00
Austria 2.37 0.63 1.90 -0.96 0.25 47.11 -21.55
Belgium 2.24 0.11 2.09 1.62 0.63 72.50 29.73
Finland 3.48 1.51 1.59 -1.54 0.02 40.52 -30.51
France 2.11 0.18 1.93 -0.29 0.33 26.90 -4.30
Germany 1.65 -0.29 1.68 -1.81 0.02 35.70 25.70
Greece 4.09 0.66 3.28 2.35 1.08 21.39 -102.42
Ireland 6.05 -1.03 3.50 -0.73 3.09 84.58 -20.94
Italy 1.49 -0.61 2.38 2.05 0.75 25.19 -29.43
Netherlands 2.27 0.64 2.46 0.55 0.82 65.39 -8.60
Portugal 1.52 -0.60 3.03 1.00 1.20 28.03 -99.90
Spain 3.74 -0.79 3.30 1.80 1.62 26.10 -84.44
Crisis	Countries'	Median 3.92 -0.70 3.29 1.40 1.41 27.07 -92.17




The upshot is that weaker macroeconomic fundamentals made those four 
countries externally more “fragile” relative to other Eurozone peers. In those 
circumstances, as observed many times in macroeconomic crises in 
emerging markets in the past, a large external shock – such as that triggered 
by the financial panic in the US in the summer of 2008, can rapidly unravel 
high external deficits.2  Figure 1 shows that the turnaround of current 














   Figure 1. Current Account Balances in the Eurozone, 1999-2015 





The fact that this was so notwithstanding the large injection of external 
multilateral financing by the European Central Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (through adjustment programs in Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal) and (from 2012) by the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM), gives an idea of the 
exceptional nature of the external adjustment that southern Europe and 
































swings in current account surpluses in the north of the Eurozone (here 
defined as Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) 
have been the flip side of the external adjustment in the South.  
 
Against this background, this chapter seeks to answer three related 
questions: 
 
• To what extent have the current account adjustments since 2008 
in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain responded to 
macroeconomic adjustments?  
• To which extent structural reforms helped current account 
adjustment and in making these economies more “competitive” 
going forward? 
• In light of recent developments in relative competitiveness and 
reforms, what could one expect regarding the path of their 




The view that the size of the current account should matter for 
macroeconomic performance is controversial among macroeconomists (see 
Obstfeld 2012, for a broad discussion and references). After all, the current 
account is the net balance between gross financial flows in and out of a 
country, and international financial integration implies that both inflows and 
outflows can (and arguably should) be very large as a share of GDP. Thus, it 
is natural that non-trivial gaps between such inflows and outflows may 
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sometime arise in the course of the economic cycle; hence the CA may 
experience temporary large deficits. Such imbalances should be even more 
expected and possibly longer lasting in a currency union where non-trivial 
differences in economic structures across member countries remain and 
exchange rate flexibility is no longer present to speed up the adjustment in 
the relative price of domestic- vs. foreign-produced goods to 
macroeconomic shocks. 
 
Yet, even in a currency union where exchange rate risk is removed and 
common central bank policies may greatly help reduce country-specific risk, 
large CA deficits lasting several years may also be problematic. For 
instance, such deficits may call into question a member country’s incentive 
to restore fiscal discipline and repay the accumulated net foreign liabilities 
when they grow large, thereby raising investors’ concerns about what 
economists call the “inter-temporal solvency constraint”. Since outright 
default and/or “hair-cuts” of the contractual value of those liabilities is one 
way to satisfy that constraint, investors may seek to limit the country’s 
indebtedness relative to its income (i.e. the ratio of external liabilities to 
GDP). A market mechanism through which this is accomplished is the rise 
in a positive interest “premium” charged by investors to lend to indebted 
governments.4 Once this financing constraint begins to hit, external 











borrowing cannot remain large, i.e., the country’s current account balance 
has to adjust to that reality. A well-known gauge of this situation is the 
spread in the interest rate of government bonds denominated in the same 
currency – in this case the euro – between countries. Such an interest spread 
began to widen rapidly for South European government bonds starting in the 
summer of 2008. While the spike in government bond spread was far from 
homogeneous across countries (in Spain for instance it started only in 2011-
12), they do suggest that debt sustainability was becoming a growing cause 
of investors’ concern under a less favorable global economic outlook. Since 
a non-trivial portion of those bonds were sold to foreigners, they were a 
clear counterpart of CA flows and thus a manifestation of concerns about the 
sustainability of these countries’ own CA deficits which persisted and grew 
even larger for several years (as illustrated in Figure 1). As often witnessed 































































































































































The key question is then what makes a CA deficit “sustainable” in the sense 
that such a constraint on further external indebtedness does not emerge. 
Learning about which variables make CA position “sustainable” is clearly 
important for policy makers to design a system of measures – of both a 
conjectural and a structural nature - to mitigate the risk of abrupt reversals in 
the flow of external financing which can take a long-lasting toll on output 
and employment.  
 
Theoretical and empirical research over the past two decades has highlighted 
a number of critical variables in this connection. These are listed in Table 2.5 
Since basic national income accounting says that the CA is what a country’s 
residents save minus what they invest, it is useful to break down CA 
determinants between drivers of domestic saving and investment, in addition 
to external influences that are not directly under the country’s control (what 
is called in the table “External Financing Shifters”), but which may 
































Table 3 shows how these variables affect CAs across the Eurozone. It does 
that by regressing the ratio of the overall current account to GDP (CA/GDP) 
of each of the original twelve members (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain) on the variables above starting in the year following the introduction 

















analysis of cross-country CA regressions, fixed effects are omitted and all 
right-hand side variables are measured relative to the foreign country 
counterparts, in this case the EU12 (GDP weighted) average.7 To 
corroborate the robustness of the estimates to the potential reversed causality 
from the CA to variables like the output gap, the fiscal balance, and credit 
growth, an instrumental variable (IV) estimator is also reported, with very 
similar results.8 
 
Table 3 shows that a relatively parsimonious model can explain about 60 
percent of intra Eurozone imbalances. This is respectful explanatory power 
given how difficult it is to explain well CA variations over time and across 
countries. Scrolling down the list of explanatory variables from the top, the 
positive effect on NFA reflects the counter-point of two effects at play. On 
the one hand, a very negative net foreign asset position (like those in 
Southern Europe) creates a negative wealth effect and calls for a positive 
trade balance so that net liabilities are eventually paid off and the inter-





















NFA implies greater flow of interest payments abroad which depresses the 
CA. On balance, the latter effect typically dominates in broad cross-country 
regressions spanning advanced and emerging market economies (see Phillips 
et al. 2013). Table 3 shows that this is also the case for the Eurozone. The 
effect is economically large: a country that has a net foreign liability of 60-
80 percentage points above the EU12 average (which is roughly what 
Greece, Portugal and Spain had before the 2008-12 financial crisis), should 
be expected to run a CA deficit of 1.5 to 2% of GDP, all else constant.  
 
As the general empirical literature on current account determinants has also 
found (see Phillips et al., 2013), differences in per capita income are also 
significant determinants of intra Eurozone CA imbalances. The sign of the 
estimates coefficient accord with a central prediction of the neo-classical 
model that richer countries (which are typically more capital abundant) 
should export capital and hence run current account surpluses on average. 
The attendant point estimate in Table 3 indicates that every US$ 5,000 
increase in per-capita income relative to the EU12 weighted average 
improves the CA by 1 percentage point of GDP. So, the fact that Southern 
Eurozone members are a few thousand euros poorer (in per capita income 
terms) than Northern Eurozone members, together with having a 60-80% 
more negative NFA/GDP ratio, already puts their current accounts into 
substantively negative territory, of the order of 3 to 4 GDP percentage 
points, holding all other (particularly cyclical) considerations constant. 
 
The following triplet of demographic variables (population growth, current 
dependency ratios, and the speed of its future evolution) have the expected 
signs and also hold significant explanatory power together, though the net 
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effect is smaller than those of the above two variables and more disparate 
across countries.9 This is both because intra-Eurozone differences in those 
variables are smaller and also because some of the crisis-hit countries 
(notably Ireland) have higher population growth and dependency ratios well 
below the EU12 average, whereas some of them (like Greece) have 
dependency ratios which are non-trivially above the EU12 average. In 
particular, the much lower dependency ratio of Ireland (about 11% below 
EU12 average) coupled with an estimated coefficient of about -0.25 does 
help account by nearly half (2.5 percentage points) of its CA/GDP gap vis-à-














	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Table	3.	Determinants	of	CA	Balances	in	EU	12	countries	
 Pooled OLS IV Method 
 





 (0.0138) (0.0136) 
Per Capita GDP, lag 2.61e-06** 2.55e-06** 
 (9.60e-07) (9.26e-07) 
Population Growth -1.714*** -1.690*** 
 (0.453) (0.457) 
Old Dependency Ratio -0.247* -0.254* 
 (0.121) (0.120) 
Aging Speed 0.144** 0.143** 
 (0.0536) (0.0541) 
Capital Controls -0.0455* -0.0476* 
 (0.0241) (0.0232) 
Primary Fiscal Balance 0.270** 0.278** 
 (0.0888) (0.0915) 
Output Gap -0.534*** -0.545*** 
 (0.145) (0.144) 
VIX * EU core -0.00535 -0.00519 
 (0.00356) (0.00342) 
Terms of Trade Growth -0.0427 -0.0444 
 (0.0656) (0.0694) 
TFP Growth 0.274** 0.259** 
 (0.0977) (0.0999) 
Change in Credit/GDP -0.145** -0.146** 
 (0.0590) (0.0588) 
 
Constant -0.00171 -0.00175 
 (0.00349) (0.00341) 
   
Observations 437 432 
R-squared 0.599 0.601 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






The above results also reject changes in the countries’ Terms of Trade 
growth and in global risk aversion – as measured by an index of implied 
stock market volatility (the so-called VIX index) as drivers of intra-
European imbalances. This lack of significance is not surprising: terms of 
trade changes tend to be correlated with the output variables included in the 
regression and risk aversion (as captured by the VIX) only matters if it 
affects countries differently (so that its effect on exports and imports are 
different).10 In the case of capital controls (measured as in Phillips et al., 
2013), the coefficient is statistically significant only at a 10% level and is 
economically small. This is not surprising since the bulk of capital account 
restrictions in Europe have been lifted in the 1990s and, in the sample of 
countries considered, were re-introduced only in Greece in 2015.  
 
Yet, the regression results point to three remaining variables as key to 
explain both how pre-crisis “excess” imbalances arose and how the post-
2008 reforms may impact future external balances in the four crisis-hit 
countries.11 
	
The first is the general government balance - here entered net of interest 
expenses to capture the component of fiscal policy that is more closely under 
control of national governments and which is more exogenous to the current 
account. As mentioned above and widely documented elsewhere, fiscal 
imbalances (on both the positive and negative side) have been an important 








statistically and economically – coefficient of 0.27 on the primary fiscal 
balance shown in Table 3 suggests that saving-investment decisions are not 
neutral to fiscal policy, implying that the so-called “Ricardian equivalence” 
does not hold: the attendant point estimate says a 10 percentage point 
improvement in the general government primary balance  (a magnitude 
which is not too much off the mark for crisis-hit countries between 2009 and 
2015) translates into a nearly 3 percentage point improvement in the 
CA/GDP ratio. So, these regression results clearly indicate that reform 
efforts which impart a significant and sustained improvement in fiscal 
balances should have far-reaching effects on Southern Europe’s external 
positions. 
  
The second key variable is the gap between real GDP and its “potential” or 
trend level (measured as in Phillips et al., 2013 by the HP filter), i.e., the so-
called “output gap”. The significant negative sign of that variable indicates 
that when demand outpaces domestic supply (i.e., the economy is 
“overheated” in popular parlance), such an excess is met by a rise in imports 
relative to exports, thus implying that the CA balance declines. 
The high-demand effect associated with a positive output gap may be 
counter-balanced by what happens to total factor productivity (TFP). As 
shown in Table 3, higher TFP growth relative to EU partners tends to 
improve the CA. This positive effect is not obvious in theory because higher 
TFP can boost investment (insofar as it raises firms’ profits) and lower 
savings (insofar as households anticipate higher income growth resulting 
from higher TFP, and increase their consumption relative to present 
income). Yet, a positive effect of higher TFP on the CA can also be 
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rationalized. For one thing, a higher TFP (implying a more productive use of 
domestic production factors) also reduces inefficient capital, thus lowering 
actual investment for a given unit of output. In addition, to the extent that a 
higher TFP signals greater investment opportunities in the future that firms 
may choose to finance out of current earnings, firms may choose to 
distribute fewer dividends, thereby raising corporate savings. More 
generally, a higher TFP implies that the country can produce at lower cost 
and hence at lower prices than abroad. Hence, the trade balance and the CA 
will tend to improve with TFP growth. This interpretation is supported by 
the fact that TOT growth is not significant in the regression as some of its 
effects are already captured by TFP growth. It follows from this that 
structural reforms that boost TFP should also help improve the CA. The 
links between structural reforms and TFP will be discussed below. 
 
Last but not least, faster growth of domestic bank credit relative to GDP 
shows up as major negative influence on the CA: a 10 percent rise in the 
ratio of credit to GDP (relative to Eurozone wide averages) leads to a CA 
deterioration of about 1.5% of GDP. Since the regressions in Table 3 already 
control for the output gap (and through it for the effects of lower real interest 
rates in the home country), such a strong effect of credit growth on the CA 
accords well with both modern theories of financial amplification, according 
to which credit expansion fuels aggregate demand (and often by more than it 
effects aggregate supply). Such a strong effect of changes in credit/GDP 
ratios on the CA also accords well with widespread commentary on 
“excessive” private sector leveraging and the importance of the bank credit 
channel in driving capital flows across the Eurozone (see, e.g. Lane and 
McQuade 2013).  As will be discussed below, since credit growth in excess 
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of GDP is highly correlated with increases in bank sector leverage, the 
econometric evidence of Table 3 does provide a case for an important role of 
regulatory frameworks in affecting intra-EU imbalances. 
 
Overall, what does this econometric model tell us about seemingly 
“excessive” external imbalances? Figure 3 plots the gaps between actual 
CA/GDP ratios and those predicted (in-sample) by the model. Two “model-
fit” lines are plotted: one that does not correct for the size of the cyclical 
























































“desirable” CA/GDP levels, but rather those that are broadly consistent with 
typical historical responses of the CA to its macroeconomic determinants 
listed in Table 2. Moreover, because shifts in private sector expectations (in 
the direction of either excessive “pessimism” or over-optimism over the 
repayment capacity of borrowers) are hard to measure and are deemed to 
have been important particularly in Ireland and Spain, this is another source 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Greece	 Ireland	 Portugal	 Spain	 Other	EZ	
(Median)	
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Altogether,	these	elements	suggest	a	generally	positive	gradient	running	
from	structural	reforms	to	improved	external	balances;	yet,	finer	
measures	of	the	“pure”	effect	of	structural	reforms	on	the	CAs	of	those	
countries	will	require	further	research	and	reliance	on	forthcoming	
data.	Be	that	as	it	may,	some	general	practical	implications	seem	
warranted	on	the	basis	of	the	evidence	presented	in	this	chapter	-	
namely:	
	
• Fiscal	adjustment	(some	of	it	stemming	from	reforms	aiming	at	
enhancing	public	sector	efficiency	and	sustainability	of	public	
finances),	financial	sector	de-leveraging,	and	generally	tighter	
credit	market	conditions	played	key	roles	in	the	massive	CA	
rebalancing	within	the	Eurozone	between	2008	and	2015.	Thus,	
smaller	fiscal	deficits	and	a	more	capitalized	and	less	leveraged	
banking	sector	appear	to	be	clearly	important	in	mitigating	the	
risk	of	a	return	to	large	imbalances	of	the	past,	once	output	
returns	to	potential.		
	
• Reforms	tend	to	improve	external	balances	to	the	extent	that	they	
improve	the	growth	of	total	factor	productivity	(TFP)	relative	to	
that	of	trading	partners.	So,	if	reducing	external	vulnerability	is	
one	of	the	main	goals	of	structural	reforms	and	if	the	positive	
supply-side	effect	of	higher	TFP	on	current	account	dominates	(as	
in	the	above	econometric	analysis),	policy	makers	should	give	
some	prominence	to	reforms	that	are	likely	to	have	tangible	
effects	on	TFP.	
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• CA	improvements	have	been	more	associated	with	a	reduction	of	
unit	labor	costs	than	with	improvements	in	consumer	prices	
relative	to	trading	partners.	Prima-facie,	such	a	decoupling	not	
only	suggests	that	reforms	in	product	markets	have	lagged	behind	
those	in	labor	markets,	but	possibly	also	that	the	effects	of	the	
latter	on	the	prices	of	final	goods	are	still	working	themselves	out.	
Given	that	estimates	of	the	elasticity	of	exports	to	changes	in	unit	
labor	costs	appear	to	be	substantial	(IMF,	2017),	even	the	modest	
reduction	in	those	costs	can	have	a	non-trivial	effect,	so	they	
appear	to	be	accounting	for	some	of	the	improvement	in	the	trade	
balance	and	the	CA.	
	
• It	thus	follow	that,	to	the	extent	that	adjustment	programs	under	
the	ESM	and	IMF	stimulated	reforms	as	part	of	their	
conditionality,	those	adjustment	programs	facilitated	a	reduction	
of	external	imbalances	and	improved	“competitiveness”,	broadly	
defined.	
	
• It	must	be	acknowledged,	however,	that	even	correcting	for	the	
harshness	of	the	recession,	a	non-trivial	part	of	the	CA	adjustment	
remains	unexplained	on	the	basis	of	historical	relationships	
between	macro	fundamentals	and	the	CA.	This	suggests	that	
expectational	factors	and	difficulties	in	measuring	current	and	
prospective	effects	of	the	reforms	on	aggregate	savings	and	
investment	are	at	play.	Thus,	to	minimize	the	risk	of	a	repeat	of	
large	imbalances	of	the	past,	policy	should	err,	if	anything,	on	the	
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side	of	caution	in	assessing	the	effects	of	stronger	macroeconomic	
fundamentals	on	the	evolution	of	external	positions.	This	in	turn,	
suggests	that	further	strengthening	of	macroeconomic	
fundamentals	and	a	consolidation	of	the	reform	agenda	are	
important	to	minimize	the	risk	of	large	external	imbalances	of	the	
past.	Such	a	cautionary	stance	may	be	all	the	more	appropriate	
once	the	economic	recovery	gathers	momentum	and	private	
sector’s	confidence	returns	to	pre-crisis	levels.	
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